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COMPATIBILITY AND COMPETITION
BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
WHICH MODEL OF CAPITALISM?
Gustavo Visentini"
I. THE DEBATE ABOUT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In the last few years, corporate governance was the object
of a wide debate among authors and commentators. The debate
focused upon the relationships among the various corporate
actors, especially with regard to publicly held corporations. In
this context, it is the existence of public shareholders, passive
and supposedly defenseless, and the rise of institutional inves-
tors that has stimulated most of the discussion.
Corporate governance has been described in a variety of
ways. For example, Joel Seligman identifies corporate gover-
nance with the management of the corporation and the corpo-
rate devices associated with the control -of management (e.g.,
reporting, auditing, etc.)' Along the same track, the mission
statement of the Vi6not Committee in France on the
gouvernement des entreprises was especially concerned with la
composition, les attributions et le mode de fonctionnement des
conseils.2 An apparently more complex approach is followed by
Colin Mayer who starts out his analysis associating corporate
governance with the principal-agent (investors-managers) rela-
* Professor of Law at LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome, Italy; Director
of CERADI-LUISS, Center of Research on Business Law; Chairman of the Associa-
tion of Italian Mutual Funds. This Article was written with the collaboration of
Dr. Eugenio Ruggiero. It reproduces, with additions and footnotes, the text of a
speech given at the conference "Corporate Governance: Crossborder Perspectives"
held in Paris, France, on March 17, 1997, and organized by the Association
d'Economie Financisre.
1. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 133-
230 (1995).
2. ANDR9 TUNC, Le Rapport Vidnot sur le Conseil d'Administration des
Socidtds Cotges, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARt [R.I.D.C.], July-Sept.
1996, at 647, 648. A similar approach is in the Cadbury Report on the Financial
Aspects of Corporate Governance, where it is said that "[c]orporate governance is
the system by which companies are directed and controlled." COMMITTEE ON THE
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE 15 (1992).
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tionship problem, concerned with ways of bringing the inter-
ests of the two parties into line and ensuring that firms are
run for the benefit of investors.3 More generally, corporate
governance has been defined as the relationship among various
participants (shareholders, directors, creditors, labor, etc.) in
determining the direction and performance of corporations.4
Given the variety of definitions, it is important to. try and
agree on a common meaning of the issue at hand.
II. THE LEGAL RELEVANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The above attempts to define corporate governance are
probably all equally correct, although possibly vague in their
legal application. For legal purposes, the definition of a concept
and the use of a new word to describe it is useful as long as
the underlying idea is different from already familiar concepts,
and as long as the definition carries a specific legal signifi-
cance.
Hence, it is meaningful to talk about "corporate gover-
nance" when the term is used to deal with something other
than the traditional corporate law issues concerning the man-
agement of the corporation, or the relationship between share-
holders and directors/officers. Indeed, this is what corporate
law has always been about. Therefore, since legal scholars
have felt the need to employ a relatively new term, i.e. "corpo-
rate governance,"5 it follows that they intended a different
object for review.
The relationships among the participants in a corporation
are, in general, a common element to all suggested definitions.
Following this observation, it may then be more appropriate to
view corporate governance as a peculiar profile of a whole set
of legal tensions and relationships that find their focus point
within the company. Corporate governance would then be
3. See generally COLIN MAYER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COMPETITION AND
PERFOIIANCE 8-9 (OECD Econ. Dep't Working Paper No. 164, June 1996).
4. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, WATCHING THE WATCHERS: COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY xvii (1996). A similar approach ap-
pears to be followed in the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).
5. The term "corporate governance" is quite new in legal jargon. Traditional
law dictionaries, such as BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) and
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969), do not even mention it.
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concerned with the overall structure, not only of corporate
regulation, but also of all those other areas of law affecting
corporate action and the exercise of power within the corpora-
tion.
This approach allows a systematic review of the existing
positions of power and the effective protection of the rights
that accrue from corporate interactions and relationships.
Eventually, corporate governance will constitute a method for
approaching issues arising from the tensions within the corpo-
ration itself, as opposed to being a model for the management
of the corporation.6 As such, the issue of corporate governance
becomes important in order to gain a systematic understanding
of the corporate phenomenon.
It is therefore most useful to academics and to legislators
in order to more correctly appraise the impact of new laws on
the existing system. It may have less relevance for the practi-
tioner or the judge in applying day-to-day law.
Summarizing all of the above concepts, corporate gover-
nance may be described as the process of bringing together the
different forces which, based upon rules of law,7 have a signifi-
cant impact on those who participate in the corporation and,
eventually, determine how power is exercised within the corpo-
ration.'
6. See GUSTAVO VISENTINI, ARGOMENTI DI DiTTo COMMERCIALE 449-51
(1997).
7. These forces have their basis in rules of law that derive from varied
sources: corporate law, banking law, securities law, bankruptcy law, labor law, etc.
For example, it is usually in banking law that we find the rule allowing, or not
allowing, banks to hold shares in industrial companies; a further example is Amer-
ican securities law, where we find a thorough regulation of the proxy system.
From a historical perspective, one of the very first developments of corporate law
affecting the corporate governance structure was the rule allowing corporations to
participate and hold shares in other corporations.
8. Arthur R. Pinto & Gustavo Visentini, Introduction to THE LEGAL BASIS OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLICLY-HELD CORPORATIONS (Arthur R. Pinto &
Gustavo Visentini eds., forthcoming 1998) [hereinafter LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE]; see also Gustavo Visentini, Corporate Governance: The Case of
Banking, BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO QUARTERLY REVIEW [BNL Q. REV.] 164-67
(Special Issue, Mar. 1997).
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III. THE MARKET-ORIENTED MODEL AND THE BANK-ORIENTED
MODEL
For purposes of this article we can adopt the common
distinction of the major existing corporate systems, which is
comprised of two main models: a market-oriented model, well
represented by the United States; and a bank-oriented model,
well represented by Germany and continental Europe (mainly
France and Italy).'
The distinction between the two models relates to the
different structure of the financial system, which is then re-
flected onto the corporate governance structure by envisaging
the configuration of a different model of shareholder.
In the market-oriented model we find a situation where
corporations collect capital directly from the public, and the
public investors directly bear the business risk of their invest-
ment.10 Securities are spread out among the public at
large," and the financial markets are very competitive. 2 In
9. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market For Innovation in the United States
and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91
Nw. U. L. REV. 865, 872 (1997); see also JORDI CANALS, UNIVERSAL BANKING 21,
44-45 (1997) (providing a recent illustration of the market and bank-oriented mod-
els).
It is clear that each country's system has its own peculiarities and differ-
ences. For example, it is unquestionable that not all U.S. listed companies are
pure publicly-held companies: quite a few of them do in fact have a precise con-
trolling shareholder. However, the model of the publicly-held corporation shapes
the legislation. The utility of proceeding through model assumptions simplifies the
logic of the relevant arguments and allows for a general overview which can then
be easily adapted to specificities and contingencies.
10. See CANALS, supra note 9, at 42.
11. Over 48% of U.S. listed shares are held by households. See ORGANIZATION
FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS 1994-
1995, ITALY 59 (1995) [hereinafter OECD ITALY]. In Germany and France, the
concentration of listed shares owned by, households is much lower, around 17-20%.
See id. Arthur Pinto reports that in 1992, about 51 million Americans owned
shares in publicly held corporations or in stock mutual funds. See Arthur R. Pinto,
United States, in LEGAL BASIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 8. More-
over, in 1994 there were approximately 9,600 publicly held corporations traded in
various markets. See id.
12. In 1996, over 2,900 companies were listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change (with a turnover value of more than $2,200 billion). See RAPPORTO IRS
SUL MERCATO AZIONARIO 137 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 RAPPORTO]; RAINER MASERA,
SAGGI DI FINANZA 298 (1997). Exchanges in Germany and Paris each totalled ap-
proximately 600 listed companies in 1996, with quite lower trading volumes. See
1997 RAPPORTO, supra, at 137; MASERA, supra, at 298. The figures are even lower
for Italy (240 listed companies with a trading volume of about $70 billion). See
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terms of ownership structure of the companies, the market-
oriented model is characterized by high fragmentation of own-
ership, where the single shareholder can hardly ever autono-
mously affect the management of the corporation.13
The bank-oriented model, on the other hand, is character-
ized by a very high degree of intermediation in the channeling
of savings from households to companies.14 Corporations col-
lect capital primarily through banks. 5 Banks serve as inter-
mediaries with the public, providing credit, owning significant
amounts of stock in the corporations, and offering a very wide
range of services both to investors and to corporations. 6 The
immediate consequence is a high quota of debt (and more spe-
cifically bank debt) in the company's financial resources, 7 and
the typical presence of major shareholders in the ownership
structure of bank-oriented model corporations. 8
So far the two models have been assumed as mere evi-
dence of a situation of fact. We now proceed to appreciate the
distinction between the two models in its more precise legal
significance.
IV. THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
THE BANK-ORIENTED AND THE MARKET-ORIENTED MODEL
From a legal point of view, the main difference between
the two models does not lie in the existence of public share-
Lorenzo Stanghellini, Corporate Governance in Italy: Strong Owners, Faithful Man-
agers. An Assessment and Proposal for Reform, 6 IND. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 91,
135 (1995).
13. Statistics show that the average percentage of outstanding shares owned
by the largest five shareholders in the United States is 25.4%. See OECD ITALY,
supra note 11, at 61. In Germany it is 41.5% and in Italy it is 86.9%. See id.
14. See CANALS, supra note 9, at 51.
15. See id.
16. See generally id. at 54-55.
17. In 1992, the leverage ratio (gross debt to total assets) of non-financial
firms was around 60% in Germany and France, and over 75% in Italy, compared
to about 50% in the United States. See OECD ITALY, supra note 11, at 71. Fur-
thermore, in 1992, confirming an equivalent trend for the previous ten years, bank
financing over total debt amounted to about 30% for German and Italian compa-
nies, while it was only around 16% for American companies. See CANALS, supra
note 9, at 24.
18. Single majority stakes account for about 60% of total stock market capi-
talization in Germany, France, and Italy. See OECD ITALY, supra note 11, at 59-
60. The contrast with the United States, where the figure is about 5%, is quite
evident. See id.
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
holders as opposed to major shareholders. Rather, it lies in the
separation of the banking industry from the securities indus-
try, and in the different range of activities that banks can
engage in.19
In the United States, the separation of banks from the
securities business, and hence the prohibition on commercial
banks from holding shares in industrial companies and engag-
ing in businesses outside of banking, is established by the well
known Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.20
Traditionally, in continental Europe, this has not been the
case, either because the separation did not occur or because it
was much more relaxed.2' Germany is the best example of a
legal system that allows banks to hold ownership stakes in
industrial companies and offer securities trading services to
their customers. As of the issuance of the European
Community's Second Banking Directive23 (Second EC Direc-
tive), the German model of universal banking has been accept-
ed by the European Community as a whole. Indeed, even in
countries like Italy where, until the implementation of the
Second EC Directive, commercial banking was formally sepa-
rated from investment banking, such separation was not as
strict as it was, and to a large extent still is, in the United
States.25 In fact, although Italian commercial banks could not
directly hold shares in industrial companies, they could hold
shares in investment banks that in turn held shares in indus-
trial companies.26
19. See CANALS, supra note 9, at 133-35.
20. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1994); see also CANALS, supra note 9, at 75.
21. See CANALS, supra note 9, at 134.
22. See Gesetz Uiber das Kreditwesen (KWG) § 1, v. 7.10.1961 (BGB1. I S.881),
amended in v. .10.28.1994 (BGB1. I S.3210); see also Theodor Baums & Philipp v.
Randow, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance: The German Experience
and a New Approach, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES:
INSIDER CONTROL AND THE ROLE OF BANKS 435, 439-51 (Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-
Ki Kim eds., 1995).
23. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1.
24. See CANALS, supra note 9, at 134.
25. See JORDI CANALS, COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES IN EUROPEAN BANKING 171
(1994); see also CANALS, supra note 9, at 134 (discussing the strict separation
between commercial and investment banking in the United States).
26. See Royal Decree-Law of Mar. 12, 1936, No. 375, arts. 33, 35 (converted
into Law of Mar. 7, 1938, No. 141, Gazz. Uff. Supp. (Mar. 15, 1938)), and the
corresponding regulations of the Bank of Italy, located in the Istruzioni di
Vigilanza, para. 20, reprinted in ASSOCIAZIONE BANCARIA ITALIANA, RACCOLTA DI
838 [Vol. XXII:3
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The higher, or lower, degree of centralization of the system
of financing for firms determines the greater, or lesser, concen-
tration of their ownership structure.
In the market-oriented model, firms have a broader choice
of financing alternatives and enjoy greater competition among
suppliers of capital." The banking industry is not the sole
provider of credit: corporations can choose to sell debt to the
public directly, or privately to banks or other financial institu-
tions (e.g., insurance companies, pension funds, etc.)28 Also,
when raising equity, corporations can choose to go public,
through the market, or private, through institutions or large
investors. Therefore, within the same financial system, one
finds competition not only within the single segments of the
financial system (banks vs. banks, securities vs. securities,
insurance companies vs. insurance companies), but also be-
tween such segments as a whole (banks vs. securities, banks
vs. insurance companies, etc.)
On the other hand, in the bank-oriented model, most often
a single bank, or bank group, will dominate the financing of
the firm, whether such financing takes place in the form of
equity or debt, public or private." Banks, either as a single
company or as a group of companies, are "universal" in the
services they offer."0 Thus, banks dominate the financial sys-
tem, either directly or through their affiliates."' They own
brokerage firms, organize mutual funds, and take part in and
lead underwriting agreements. 2 The role of the bank is then
central to corporate finance.
The main area of competition in supplying financing to
firms involves institutions, rather than forms of financing and
TESTI LEGISLATIVI E NORMATvi IN MATERIA CREDITIZIA 376-77 (1978).
27. See generally CANALS, supra note 9, at 42.
28. See generally id. at 99 (discussing the diminishing role of traditional bank
loans as a means of corporate financing).
29. See Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 872.
30. See, e.g., Theodor Baums & Michael Gruson, The German Banking Sys-
tern-System of the Future?, 19 BROOK. J. INTL L. 101, 105-06 (1993) (discussing
the broad range of services offered by the "universal" banks of Germany).
31. See generally Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 872.
32. See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 188 (1994)
("[tihe largest German banks are also Germany's largest brokerage houses.");
Baums & Gruson, supra note 30, at 106 (services offered by German banks in-
clude "underwriting and trading, mutual fund operations, and investment advis-
ing.").
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financial products. This is not to say that stock ownership is
not relevant; actually, in countries like France or Germany we
find quite active stock exchanges.3 However, their role is an-
cillary to the main banking circuits. Stock markets offer com-
panies a possibility to diversify their sources of financing, and
investors a speculative niche to invest their savings. Stock
exchanges remain within the banking circuits and securities
trading becomes one of the services offered by the banks. Most
of the securities firms are bank affiliates. Although securities
buy and sell orders are executed on the exchange, they are
channeled through the banking network. 4 Thus, the organi-
zation of the stock exchange itself rests upon banks: in Italy,
for example, the Stock Exchange was recently transformed into
a private company (Borsa s.p.a.) and its shares were sold to
intermediaries, 90% of which were banks or bank affiliates."
A good indicator of such an ancillary function of public mar-
kets in corporate finance is the fact that the development of
the securities markets in those countries involves stock rather
than debt instruments.36 This is a reflection of the banking
industry's predominance with respect to the provision of credit
to firms.
The central position of the banks within the financial
system is also relevant for the quality of trading on the stock
exchange. The involvement of banks in industrial companies as
stock owners provides an incentive for banks to act as de facto
market makers for trading on those shares, thus increasing the
liquidity of the market itself.
In summary, it may be said that in the bank-oriented
33. See Andrew Fisher & Andrew Jack, German, French Bourses in Link-up
Talks, FIN. TIMES, June 21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11036353. However, the
phenomenon is quite recent in its developments. See Andrew Fisher, DTB is Pre-
paring to Spread its Wings, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL
11037887; Andrew Jack, International Company News: Matif Celebrates 10 Specu.
lative Years-The Paris Exchange Has Seen Rapid Growth Since its Inception, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6145355.
34. In Italy, for example, about 70% of the securities trading was done direct-
ly by banks in 1996. See BANCA D'ITALA, ASSEMBLEA GENERALE ORDINARIA DEI
PARTECIPANTI, RELAZIONE DEL GOVERNATORE: SULL'ESERCIZIO 1996, at 319 (1997).
Of the remaining 30%, about 60% was done by securities fin-ms included in bank-
ing groups. See id.
35. See Antonio Quaglio, Borsa Spa, I'Imi sigla il trionfo Sint, IL SOLE-24
ORE, Sept. 13, 1997, at 27.
36. Debentures represent only about 3% of total liabilities of German compa-
nies, compared to 23% for the United States. See CANALS, supra note 9,'at 170.
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model, securities trading and direct collection of capital from
the public become components of the banks' management poli-
cy, whereas, in the market-oriented model banks are direct
competitors of the public markets in providing finance for in-
dustrial companies.
This situation does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that, because the banking system faces no competing forces
from different forms of financing, it is less efficient. As long as
there is competition within the banking system, finance will
still be efficient, whether it is allocated through bank groups or
through several and separate channels."
V. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND ITS
EFFECTS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES
In the market-oriented model, the variety of competing
sources of funds for firms causes a more diffuse control of the
corporation and creates a complex system of checks and bal-
ances among the various stakeholders." This situation finds
immediate evidence in the U.S. corporate governance rules,
which have their major focus upon the protection of individual
investors such as shareholders or creditors.39 This protection
takes place through stringent mechanisms of disclosure and
effective enforcement of liability that resemble those afforded
37. In this respect, a critical look should be given to the Italian financial
system, which falls within the bank-oriented model. Examining the ownership
structure of the banking system, it may be noticed that most banks, and surely
the largest ones, have a direct or indirect proprietary connection with one single
shareholder (the State). See Giuseppe Bisconti & Luciano Mona.co, Italy, in BANKS
ABROAD 213, 214 (Friedrich Schwank & Frank R. Ryder eds., 1986). The impres-
sion is that such a situation creates the conditions for the operation of an oligopo-
ly and, to a large extent, of an implicit cartel, which may bring the system far
from efficiency. Ultimately, rather than talking about the Italian banking industry,
one could actually end up talking about one large Italian banking group. For this
aspect, the situation appears even more critical when considering the wide powers
enjoyed by the Bank of Italy, i.e., the banking supervisory body. See EUROPEAN
BANKING LAW: A GUIDE TO CONSIUNITY, MEMBER STATE AND EFTA NATIONAL
LEGISLATION 62 (Coopers & Lybrand Europe ed., 1990).
38. See Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 872-73.
39. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (discussing
shareholder derivative actions, the purpose of which is "to place in the hands of
the individual shareholder a means to protect the interests of the corporation from
malfeasance."); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983)
("[diefrauded investors are among the very individuals Congress sought to protect
in the [U.S.] securities laws.").
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by the law of consumer protection." Indeed, in this system,
the first and main mechanism for the protection of individual
investors is the development of rules encouraging and ensuring
the correct functioning of securities exchanges and the prompt
liquidity of investments.
There is no doubt, however, that also in the United States
system there are very large investors, such as pension funds,
that may have the resources to acquire large stakes in compa-
nies and hence take an active role in their management.4
This has hardly ever happened in the past, although today the
situation is moving towards a change.42 In any case, it should
be stressed that, because of the features of the banking busi-
ness and its wide range of contacts with the firms (deposits,
loans, liquidity management, etc.), no institutional investor,
other than banks, is able to acquire the same expertise and
"know how" to be involved in active corporate participation.
The development of the U.S. corporate governance structures
reflected the need for specialization, which would then enhance
efficiency: shareholders would specialize in risk-bearing but
wanted diversification, and firms needed specialized, profes-
sional management. Furthermore, there are many legislative
rules that contribute to the passive role of institutional inves-
40. An example of this can be found in the U.S. rules prohibiting insider
trading. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
41. The United States is experiencing a very high degree of institutionaliza-
tion of savings. In 1994, financial assets entrusted to institutional investors (mutu-
al funds, pension funds and life insurance companies) were about 37% of total
households' financial assets, compared to 29% in Germany and 27% in France. See
RAPPORTO IRS SUL MERCATO AZIONARIO 78 (1996) (statistics described in Table
2.1).
42. In recent times, the situation has been changing. U.S. institutional inves-
tors, and more specifically pension funds, are starting to become more involved in
the management issues of corporations. See William Dale Crist, The Domestic and
International Corporate Governance Role of the California Public Employees' Re-
tirement System (an Example for Study) 1-8 (Oct. 1994) (unpublished paper, pre-
sented at Universitd Cattolica Del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy, on file with Brooklyn
Journal of International Law). Even the latest guidance given to pension funds by
the Department of Labor under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 reports that in certain situations it may be appropriate for a fiduciary to
engage in "activities intended to monitor or influence the management of corpora-
tions . .. [if! the responsible fiduciary concludes that such monitoring . . . is like-
ly to enhance the value of the plan's investment." Interpretative Bulletin Relating
to Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policy or
Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (1996). However, this does not seem to be affect-
ing the structure of the financial system and corporate governance, since, on the
whole, institutional investors remain independent from the banking system.
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tors in corporate governance." The Glass-Steagall Act is an
example, together with the original localization of banks at the
state level;' so is the "prudent man" rule obliging fund man-
agers to diversify their investments and to adopt the so-called
'all Street rule" in their management strategies.45
In the bank-oriented model the situation is instead sym-
metrical. A greater concentration in the ownership structure of
corporations, which is made possible by the existence of insti-
tutions, mainly banks, that can assume large stakes of stock in
the companies, configures a system of corporations where the
predominant shareholder pattern is the large and active share-
holder. Control is tightly held through complex systems of close
relationships, consisting of shareholders' agreements or of
sophisticated cross and circular holdings of shares.4" In the
European model, the bank is universal. It has few barriers
with respect to holding shares in industrial companies and,
even where those barriers exist, their threshold is high enough
to allow banks to have an important, and often determinant,
voice in management. 47 The corporate governance rules that
then follow are designed in view of such shareholder patterns.
Therefore, a greater variety and amount of corporate power is
43. According to Mark Roe, such legislation is founded upon a precise political
drive against high concentrations of private power. See ROE, supra note 32, at xiv.
44. See generally Edward L. Symons, Jr., The United States Banking System,
19 BROOK. J. INTL L. 1, 4-5, 9-10 (1993).
45. The prudent man rule governs investment management by trustees and
various other fiduciaries. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the
Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 52 (1987). The typical for-
mulation of the Wall Street rule is that institutional shareholders should "either
vote with management or, if unhappy, sell." Mark J. Roe, Political Theory of
American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUmI. L. REV. 10, 28 (1991).
46. For an overview of the German system of circular shareholdings, see
Ulrich Wastl & Franz Wagner, Wechselseitige Beteiligungen im Aktienrecht, DIE
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, June 1997, at 241, 241-50. For the Italian case, see
Giovanni Ferri & Sandro Trento, La Dirigenza Delle Grandi Banche e Imprese:
Ricambio e Legami, in STORIA DEL CAPITALISMO ITALIANO (Fabrizio Barca ed.,
1997), and the research led by CARLO DE GENNARO, MIRTA MUSOLINO, & LUCA
TORCHIA, Struttura Proprietaria e Modelli di Controllo con Riferimento alle Societd
Italiane Quotate: Alcune Consderazioni alla Luce di Una Verifica Empirica (forth-
coming 1997).
47. According to the European Community's Second Banking Directive, banks'
ownership of shares in one non-financial company should be limited to 5% of such
company's equity capital, and the bank may not concentrate holdings of a single
company above 15% of its own capital. See Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC,
supra note 23, art. 12(1); see also CANALS, supra note 9, at 134.
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granted to the individual shareholder, with the assumption
that the shareholder will have the capacity and the incentive
to exercise such powers. For example, we find a wider compe-
tence in the general meeting of shareholders. In the United
States the role of shareholders in the overall management of
the corporation is generally relegated to the appointment and
removal of directors and to the amendment of the articles of
incorporation.48 On the other hand, in Italy and in other Eu-
ropean countries, the shareholders' meeting is generally com-
petent for the approval of the balance sheet and the distribu-
tion of dividends, the appointment of auditors, the issuance of
new shares, the issuance of company debentures, and the sin-
gle shareholder may individually challenge the validity of any
shareholders' decision in court.49
VI. THE COMPETITION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT MODELS OF
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The efficiency of a financial system, be it bank-oriented or
market-oriented, is to be measured against the performance of
its users, i.e., industry and commerce. Finance may be said to
have no value in and of itself: it is functional to the real econo-
my and its quality must be appreciated in terms of utility to
firms.
Despite the heavy debate among economists,"0 the overall
efficiency of each economic system may not be said to substan-
tially differ as a consequence of the financial model adopted:
comparable standards of living in the different countries are
evidence that the competitive advantages and disadvantages of
either system eventually even out. Either system is then com-
petitive in itself. The U.S. system is generally said to be more
flexible in adjusting to changes because of its greater reliance
upon market mechanisms.5 However, such greater flexibility
48. See JAMEs D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 13.1, at 306 (1997); HARRY G.
HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 188, at 490-91 (3d ed.
1983).
49. See Stanghellini, supra note 12, at 112, 175-76. It is evident, however,
that the European model of corporate regulation, based upon a system of checks
and balances maintained by the existence of several large and active shareholders,
may easily cause distortions if the assumption (i.e., the plurality of large share-
holders) falls.
50. For a general overview, see CANALS, supra note 9, at 69-72.
51. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and
[Vol. XXIII:3844
WHICH MODEL OF CAPITALISM?
has heavy costs in terms of crises its industries have to under-
go when facing those adjustments. On the other hand, the
European system compensates for its alleged lack of flexibili-
ty52 with a more stable and fine-tuned process of adjustment
and adaptability, perhaps with lower peaks in its business
cycles, but also with higher troughs.53
The American and European financial systems, as such,
compete with each other. Given the barriers to entry into one
system for financial institutions based and operating in the
other system, the competition is evidenced by the competitive-
ness of industrial and commercial companies in their products
markets. In this respect there exists competition between the
two models of finance, and such competition is further en-
hanced by the existing competition among industrial compa-
nies.
In the last decade, a very important event that is strongly
affecting the behavior of firms is the globalization of the mar-
kets. However, the trend towards globalized and world mar-
kets is much more a reality, both in fact and in law, for the
markets for goods than it is for the markets for finance.
Whereas goods can substantially move and trade freely around
the world, there is still quite a high resistance in allowing full
freedom of movement of capital. Indeed, even the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) charter allowed Member States to main-
tain a protective regime over capital movements,54 since the
general idea was that the exclusive function of finance was to
serve the real economy.5 As long as each financial system re-
Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the
United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 96-99 (1995).
52. E.g., its delayed response to changes and slower transition.
53. The alleged different response of the American and European systems to
efficiency drives has historical, political, social, and cultural roots. We take it as a
common sense conclusion, since this is not the appropriate place to analyze it in
greater depth.
54. Article VI, § 3 of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF Agreement) states that "Members may exercise such controls as are
necessary to regulate international capital movements." Articles of Agreement of
the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, art. VI, § 3, 60 Stat. 1401, 1409,
2 U.N.T.S. 39, 62. In this respect, the main objective of the IMF Agreement was
to liberalize the making of payments and transfers for current international trans-
actions. See id. art. VIII, § 2; see also generally Ronald I. McKinnon, The Rules of
the Game: International Money in Historical Perspective, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1
(1993).
55. Such an attitude was also present in academic and scientific milieus at
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mained within its own boundaries (the only connection being
the competition on the products market between their respec-
tive customers, the industrial companies), no issue of compet-
ing corporate governance structures could arise. The isolation
of each financial system caused industrial companies to remain
closely tied to their original sources of finance, thus avoiding
any possible effect or alteration of the current corporate owner-
ship structures.
However, the rapid progress in technologies and, above all,
the change of attitude towards finance, along with the political
decision to open up financial markets to international competi-
tion, are all factors that urge the globalization of the financial
systems as well. This event may indeed bring about serious
effects and alterations in corporate governance.
VII. THE GLOBALIZATION OF FINANCE: THE DIRECT
COMPETITION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ITS
POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
As globalization progresses, the legal distinction between
the market-oriented model and the bank-oriented model be-
comes less significant. Financial institutions originally based
in one model system will start competing directly with finan-
cial institutions based in the other model system, whereas so
far they have only engaged in competition indirectly through
the industrial companies to which they offered their services.
The direct competition among financial institutions will
most probably cause greater uniformity and harmonization of
the regulatory framework. Ultimately, however, it will break
down the barriers between the single systems, transforming
the financial system into a global one ruled by growing compe-
tition and market mechanisms.
In this respect, it is worth noting that the globalization of
finance is growing stronger and stronger with respect to in-
vestment services," while there are still quite high barriers to
that time. For example, the famous Modigliani-Miller theory, holding that the
composition of finance is irrelevant in determining the value of the firm, dates
back to those years. See generally Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost
of Capital Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV.
261 (1958).
56. For example, more and more companies are starting to list their shares
both on national and on foreign exchanges. See Daniel Kadlec, Investing Abroad,
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the transnational offering of banking services. There are sev-
eral reasons explaining the slower banking globalization pro-
cess. At an economic level, the real competitive advantage of
banks is their diffuse retail network, and the setting up ex
novo of an effective network requires huge investments. At a
political and legislative level, banks are deemed to be a strate-
gic industry for the national economic system because of the
public policy concerns connected with banks and their role in
monetary policy. Such factors tend to keep the banking indus-
try protected from outside competition.
However, even assuming a full legal aperture of the finan-
cial markets, competition is going to spur much faster in the
investment services industry than in the banking industry,
since investment services do not benefit (or suffer) from the
same economies of scale and experience as banking. As it was
explained before, the banking system, in its own essence, has a
greater capacity to resist new competitive forces, especially due
to its close connection with the local communities and its pro-
ductive texture. In this framework, U.S. investment firms may
have a competitive advantage against similar European firms,
given their greater habit to adjust to market forces. Neverthe-
less, U.S. investment firms and banks lack the experience and
the economies of scale of European universal banks, whose
long tradition of engaging in a wide range of services and ex-
ploiting synergies among them, will contribute to their sound-
ness and their capacity to enter new markets.
The globalization of finance, forcing financial institutions
coming from different systems to compete directly with each
other in providing resources to industrial companies, will bring
about new developments. U.S. institutional investors, with
their own "investment culture," are entering the European
markets more and more, whereas the same will happen with
European universal banks and the U.S. markets.5" This will
TIME, Sept. 29, 1997 at Bll, B12. More significantly, in some instances companies
do not even consider listing on their national exchanges and directly list their
shares on foreign exchanges. Moreover, as a consequence of the greater liberaliza-
tion of capital movements, mutual funds and pension funds are also starting to
diversify their investments at the international level.
57. See James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate Governance
and United States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INTL L. 1, 10-11 (1995)
(discussing the increasing trend of U.S. institutional investors entering the Europe-
an Market).
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surely cause serious changes in corporate governance struc-
tures. As new actors enter the stage of the financial market,
the plurality of sources of finance for firms becomes more di-
versified, and the traditional power structure within firms
tends to be upset. Since globalization is affecting the invest-
ment services industry more than the banking industry, the
primary area of greater competition will be Europe, rather
than the United States. In fact, the principal actors of the
European financial market, the banks, will still find hindranc-
es in entering the U.S. market with all of their universal ca-
pacity.
VIII. THE POLITICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM GLOBALIZATION
Globalization and the movement towards greater aperture
of the internal markets may raise political problems.
The enhancement of market mechanisms and the removal
of barriers go along with the growing dimension of the mar-
kets. However, when such larger markets are politically frag-
mented (as it is still the case for Europe at the present time),
the State's political responsibility to its own community comes
to struggle against greater economic freedom. 8 Many mea-
sures are being taken that appear as protectionist devices
implementing some sort of autarchy. One example is the grant-
ing of the so called "golden share" to the State when selling
large state-owned companies, operating in strategic industries,
to the public.59
Such concerns may be misread as mere local particularism
or as expressions of an out-of-date nationalism. It should be re-
called, however, that the State has a political responsibility to
its constituencies and territories. It cannot afford to lose sover-
58. Undoubtedly, in a relatively smaller national context, the presence of most
types of industrial plants within national territories maintains quite a significant
political meaning.
59. In Italy, the Law n. 47411994, regulating the privatization process of
State-owned companies, grants the Government the possibility to keep special
voting rights in public utilities companies (e.g., electricity, telecommunications),
providing the Treasury with the power to veto acquisition of large shareholdings
by any single investor, and to forbid the breaking-up, liquidation or transfer
abroad of the company. See Law of July 30, 1994, No. 474, Gazz. Uff. (July 30,
1994, No. 177), 80 Lax Part I, at 2787; see also COMM 1ISSIONE PER IL RJASSETVO
DEL PATRIMONIO MOBILIARE PUBBLICO E PER LE PRIVATIZZAZIONI, RAPPORTO AL
MINISTRO DEL TESORO 39-42 (Nov. 7, 1990). Also, similar provisions are still in
place in many of the British public utilities companies privatized during the 1980s.
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eignty over particular industrial or commercial sectors, al-
though those sectors may be more efficient if allocated outside
the country and more so in view of the fact that very often,
given the size of the country, the single undertaking coincides
with the whole sector."
Moreover, there is indeed an issue of democracy that
should be carefully reviewed. Democracy, and more specifically
economic democracy, may in fact be implemented through
participation of people in the governing of firms;6 but above
all, it may also be implemented by subjecting the firms to the
rule of law established by national parliaments. Actually, the
latter is the most correct and most common form of implemen-
tation of economic democracy for the business environment.
When the allocation of economic resources takes place only
as a consequence of an efficiency drive, such market mecha-
nisms will eventually overrule Parliaments and Governments
that will be, de facto, expropriated of their legislative and exec-
utive powers with respect to the global economic actors. As it
can easily be imagined, the host country will have no sover-
eignty over the foreign institution, whereas the home country
of the institution will have no interest in regulating the opera-
tions of the institution in the foreign country. The paradoxical
consequence may then be to have institutions operating inter-
nationally only subject to the rules of the market, with no
precise rule of law limiting the exercise of their power. An
interesting parallel may be drawn with the events surrounding
the development of the eurocurrency market a few years ago.
Huge amounts of money were able to flow from market to
market with no authoritative control over their origin and
destination and ultimately blamed for the European currency
crisis in 1992.2 It is difficult to imagine that Governments
60. A typical example of this attitude is the EU Common Agricultural Policy.
See generally EUROPEAN COmMISSION, BULL. OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES SuPP. No.
5/91, THE DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE OF THE COMION AGRICULTURAL POLICY 9-12
(1991) (describing origin and effects of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy).
61. Such an idea of democracy is reflected in NORBERTO BOBBIO, WHICH SO-
CIALISM? 100-01 (Roger Griffon trans., Richard Bellamy ed., Univ. of Minn. Press
1987) (1976); see also GUSTAVO VISENTINI, LEZIONI DI TEORIA GENERALE DEL
DIRITTO 81-95 (1997).
62. See generally Barry Riley, Portfolio of Uncertainties, FIN. TIMES (LONDON),
Oct. 26, 1992 (discussing the European currency crisis of 1992), available in
LEXIS, News Library, Fintme File; Walter Russel Mead, Europe's Death Knell,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992 (same), available in LEXIS, News Library, LAT File.
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will allow similar events to happen and develop in the indus-
trial sector!
The reaction to such situations tends to bring these insti-
tutions, and the relative massive flows of financial funds, un-
der the rule of law of supra-national organizations, either
strengthening existing ones or creating new forms of interna-
tional collaboration. Prominent examples in this respect have
occurred quite recently. Right after the Mexican crisis of 1995,
a heated debate developed concerning the extension of the role
of the IMF."e Moreover, the Basle Agreements on banking
supervision were aimed at setting a uniform standard of bank-
ing supervision across the world, enhancing all forms of collab-
oration among national supervisory agencies.'
IX. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I would like to briefly try to give an answer
to the question posed in the title: '"Which model of capitalism?"
Certainly, as a consequence of the globalization of the
markets, for both goods and finance, one can notice a new type
of capitalism. However, the novelty does not seem to concern
the operational mechanisms of capitalism: the market still
operates, and will continue to operate, according to mecha-
nisms founded upon the struggle and dialectics among private,
public and administrative powers. One may talk about a redis-
covery of Keynesian philosophy over the role of Public Authori-
ties and of regulation in the global economy.65 That role, as it
63. See generally David Hale, Such a Deal, The Much-Maligned Mexican Bail-
out is Looking Smart, WASH. POST, June 2, 1996 (discussing the role of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) in assisting Mexico through 1995 financial crisis),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File; Clay Chandler, IMF Director Sug-
gests Broad Changes, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1995 (discussing reactions to IMF re-
sponse to 1995 Mexican financial crisis), available in LEXIS, News Library, Wpost
File.
64. See Timothy Haosen Wan, Comparative Approaches to Regulatory "Safety
and Soundness", in 1 INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION:
CHANGE AND TRANSFOIIATION IN THE 1990S 261, 264-66 (J.J. Norton et al. eds.,
1994). The necessity of furthering the enhancement of more stringent forms of
international banking supervision became ever more pressing and urgent after the
recent Barings crack. See Sara Webb et al., A Royal Mess: Britain's Barings PLC
Bets on Derivatives-and the Cost is Dear, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at Al.
65. Under the Keynesian theory, which was set forth in a definitive treatise
written by John Maynard Keynes during the 1930s, the government seeks to con-
trol the economy through its fiscal policies. See generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES,
THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (Harcourt Brace
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was described, is becoming more pervasive, but under a differ-
ent perspective. In fact, the objective of strengthening and
favoring the functioning of market mechanisms is gaining
prominence over the objective of keeping the economy under
strict control. The experience is there to demonstrate that the
operation of market mechanisms cannot mean pure laissez
faire! The novelty lies in the dimension of the phenomenon: the
scale firms must face is a world scale, and the urge towards a
global operation, not limited by national boundaries, is incredi-
bly powerful. In this context, the legal framework, while be-
coming globalized in its protection and enforcement of property
rights, becomes the essential pillar upon which the market
operates and, hence, market forces efficiently allocate wealth
and resources.
Therefore, no new model of capitalism is probably arising
but, as a consequence of new forces and impulses, societies as
a whole will certainly undergo a drastic and revolutionary
change, heading towards a new international economic order,
much the same way as it is happening for the international
political order.
Jovanovich 1964) (1936).
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